Moscow and arms control : evidence from the Sino-Soviet dispute by Clemens, Walter C.

c/65-17
June 1965
MOSCOW AND ARMS CONTROL: EVIDENCE
FROM THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE
by
Walter C. Clemens, Jr.
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
Center for International Studies
International Communism Project
m
 
-
-
-
m
 
-
-
m
 
m
 
m
 
m
 
m
 
m
 
m
 
-
T. THE SETTING1
"The atomic bomb does not adhere to the class principle--
it destroys everybody within the range of its devastating force."
With these words the Soviet Communist Party statement of July 14,
1963 attempted to epitomize the differences in its outlook and
the views of Peking on central issues of war and peace, Both
parties to the Sino-Soviet polemic have engaged in distortion
and exaggeration, but their dispute has thrown considerable
new light on the zigs and zags of Soviet and Chinese policy over
the past decade. The present essay seeks to sift the polemic
for evidence on one bone of contention: Soviet policy on nu-
clear proliferation and, more generally, on arms control and
East-West detente. The nodule points in 1957, 1959, and 1962
will receive particular attention. The basic approach will be
to weigh evidence from the Sino-Soviet polemic against the record
of Soviet disarmament diplomacy with the West and other informa-
tion regarding military and political relations between Moscow
and Peking.
The basic question we seek to answer is: What was China's
impact on Soviet policy toward arms control? First we must
1 The author wishes to express his thanks for suggestions
and support to Dr. William E. Griffith and the International
Communism Project at M.I.T.
2 For example, China's alleged indifference--according to
Moscow--to a nuclear holocaust or Peking's charges regarding
Soviet "pacifism." See Walter C. Clemens, Jr., "The Sino-Soviet
Dispute--Dogma and Dialectics on Disarmament," International
Affairs (London), Vol0 41, No0 2 (April 1965), pp. 204-222,
-I-
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summarize the main characteristics of that policy and, the role
played by factors other than the position of Russia's fraternal
ally to the east.3 The Kremlin's position on arms control seems
to have passed through three major stages in the past decade:
first, from 1955 to 1960, a trend toward greater realism and
feasibility, manifested., e g., by increasing interest in partial
measures like a nuclear test ban; second, from 1960 to 1962,
ambivalence and recalcitrance, exemplified by obstructionist
tactics in negotiations and by the decisions to resume nuclear
testing in 1961 and send missiles to Cuba in 1962; third, from
1962 to Khrushchev's fall in 1964., intensified interest in agree-
ments on specific arms control measures. Stabilizing the East-
West military environment by means of arms control became a
salient goal of Soviet strategy even while anti-Western propa-
ganda and propagation of general and complete disarmament
remained as tactics-, to buttress Moscow's position in the ranks
of international communism.
The continuities and the changes in Soviet arms control
policy seem to have reflected foremost the constants and varia-
bles in the East-West military balance of power. A second key
factor was Khrushchev's calculation (except perhaps from the
1960 Paris Summit Confterence until after the Cuban missile crisis)
3 See Lincoln Pc Bloomfield, Walter C. Clemens, Jr,.
Franklyn Griffiths, Soviet Interests in Arms Control and Disarma-
ment: The Decade Under Krshchev, 195-964 (Cambridge, Mass0 o:
Center for International Studies, MOI.To, mimeo-, 1965); see also
Walter C. Clemens, Jrc , Soviet Disarmament Policy,__1917-l9 6 3,
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that peaceful coexistence on his terms was feasible with the
moderate governments in the West. Domestic politics and economic
factors provided both goads and limits to Soviet policies on arms
control, but they seemed generally to play a role subordinate
to exogenous forces.
Within this framework what was the role of China?
There is little evidence that China played any significant
role in the decisions which brought on the shift in Soviet arms
control policy in 1954-1955. But as early as February 1.956 and
certainly by the second half of 1957 the state of Sino-Soviet
relations became a key determinant of the twists and turns of
Soviet foreign policy generally and, increasingly, toward arms
control in particular. There was virtually a steady deteriora-
tion of Sino-Soviet relations, precisely in those areas which
would most affect arms control policy, most prominently charac-
terized by steadily mounting Chinese opposition to Soviet detente
and disarmament policy.
The inducements toward accommodation with the West result-
ing from the Chinese political and--in the long run--potential
military threat seems to have been much more decisive than the
restraints which flowed from Moscow's interest in keeping its
most powerful ally within the fold.
An Annotated Bibliography of Soviet and Western Sources (Stanford,
Calif.: The Hoover Institution, 1965).
1L THE "NEW TECHNOLOGY" PACT, 1957-1959
The Chinese date the downturn of Sino-Soviet relations from
the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956, while Moscow initially
dated it from the Chinese ideological attacks of April and. June
1960 but then traced it to 1958, presumably to disagreements
4
over China's "Great Leap Forward" program.' One Western ana-
lyst sees the dispute as virtually irreparable after the summer
of 1959 (subject, however, to a shift of leadership).5 In any
event, Moscow appears after 1959 to have decided to run whatever
risks would be invrolved in pursuing its own course toward the
West regardless of Chinese opposition Although there were
moments of lessened hostility, divergent power political inter-
ests, ideologica differences, and personal frictions moved
Sino-Soviet relations almost inexorably toward an open rift.
According to Peking Mocow had been "correct" until 1956
in calling for the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons, and
China supported this view But at the Twentieth Congress
The 1958 date was cited in Mikhail A. Suslov's secret ad-
dress on February 1,4 1964, which was published only in April
1964. "Struggle of the CPSTU for the Unity of the World Communist
Movement," Soviet Documents, Vol 11, No 16 (April 20, 1964),
po 43. A subsequent Soviet statement indicated serious differ-
ences with China over Outer Mongolia as early as Khrushchev's
1954 trip to Peking, See "Concerning Mao Tse-tung's Talk with a
Group of Japanese Socialists " Pravda, September 2, L964, p. 2.
Wilianm E. Griffith, The Sinc-Soviet Rift (Cambridge,
Mass. -. The M. L T. Press , 196, pp. 18and.29
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Khrushchev had stated that Russia would stop testing if other
nuclear powers followed suit and. stressed that implementation
of "such measures could pave the way of agreement on other more
intricate aspects of disarmament." (At the U.N. Disarmament
Commission Subcommittee on March 27, 1956 Khrushchev's lead was
followed by Gromyko's proposal for a hydrogen bomb test ban as
a partial measure which could be implemented without inspection.)
In Chinese eyes Khrushchev "divorced the cessation of nuclear
tests from the question of disarmament. Subsequently the CPSU
leaders were wrong on certain issues and, correct on others, and.
we supported, them in all their correct views"6 It is possible
that objections to the ideclogical revisionism of Khrushchev
were probably more muted in 1956 than Peking later suggested.
But there can be little doubt that the Chinese leadership was
dismayed at other aspects of Khrushchev's policies, especially
the vigor of the Soviet Union's economic and, political march
into the third world, including Nehru's India, since it in-
fringed on territory Peking staked out for Chinese influence
even before the Bandung Conference. Further, as noted above,
Mao Tse-tung and Khrushchev disagreed. as early as 1954 over the
status of Outer Mongolia. 7
6 Chinese statement of August 15, 1963, Document 7 in ibid0,
pp. 340-353, at po 352.
See note 4. Another indication that all was not well
between Moscow and Peking derives from the pattern of their trade
balance, which al41-r-d in 1955-1956 SO the Chinese exrnrts to
Russia thereafter exceeded imports from the Soviet Union, See
note 29.
Despite this early evidence of a Soviet interest in stop-
ping the spread of nuclear weapons, the Chinese leadership
decided in 1956 to depend on a transitional military strategy
that required heavy reliance on the Soviet Union. Chinese
hopes for Soviet nuclear assistance may have been fanned, by
Moscow's 1955 plan for sharing Soviet experience in the peace-
ful uses of atomic energy with the Communist bloc. By mid-1957
ten Chinese scientists were engaged in research in high-energy
physics at the Joint Institute in Dubna. A research reactor and
cyclotron, which the Soviet Union promised China in 1955, finally
began operation in September 1958)9
The strengthening of Khrushchev's personal position and, the
intensified Soviet commitment to Khrushchev's peaceful coexis-
tence line which followed the removal of the "antiparty group"
10
in 1.957 took place at the same time that the Soviet Union demon-
strated its new military might by t he successful launching of an
ICBM in August and Sputnik I in October 1957 These dramatic
8 Alice Langley Hsieh, Communist China's Strategy in the
Nuclear Era (Englewood Cliffs, N, JoL Prentice Hall, 1962),
Chapter 2.
9 Anne M. Jonas, "The Soviet Union and the Atom: Peaceful
Sharing, 1954-1958" (Santa Monica, Cal..: RAND Corporation RM-
2290 , November 20, 1958), p. 88
10 See the "Resolution of the Plenary Session of the Party
Central Committee. -- On the Anti-Party Group of G. M. Molotov,
L. M. Kaganovich and V. M. Molotov," Pravda, July 4, 1957, pp 1-2;
CDSP, Vol. IX, No. 23 (July 17, 1957), pp. 5-7; see also, "For a
Leninist Peace Policy," International Affairs, No. 7, 1957, pp-
5-10
-7.-
feats suggested to Peking that the time had come for a more
forward political strategy by the Communist camp; it turned out
that Peking d.rew more radical conclusions from these successes
than Moscow. For Mao Tse-tung the ICBM test meant that the
balance of forces now favored. in an absolute sense the Communist
camp: the East wind was prevailing over the West wind.. Soviet
statements, on the other hand, averred only that the balance had
shifted relatively to favor the Communist bloc. The evidence
suggested that Mao, convinced that the over-all strength of
socialism outweighed that of imperialism, believed the bloc "could
now pursue a policy of 'brinkmanship in selected areas under the
cover of the Soviet nuclear shield. " Thus it was hardly acci-
dental that Soviet spokesmen began in the fall of 1957 to warn of
the dangers of broad escalation from local military conflicts.
At the same time, Peking may have been encouraged at least
temporarily to exercise restraint in its relations with Moscow
because of a Soviet commitment that, Peking later implied, bound
Moscow to help China develop niclear weapons. The primary source
is a Chinese statement of August 15, 1963:
As far back as June 20, 1959, when there was
not yet the slightest sign of a treaty on stopping
nuclear tests, the Soviet Government unilaterally
tore up the agreement on new technology for national
defense concluded between China and the Soviet Union
11 Donald S. Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956-1961
(Princeton, N. J., Princeton University Press, 1962), p. 168;
Hsieh, _o, eg., p. 85; see also Harold P. Ford, "Modern Weapons
and the Sino-Soviet Estrangement," The China Quarterly, No. 1.8
(April-June .1964), pp. l61-l62.
on Octbber 15, 1957, and refused to provide China
with a sam.ple of an atomic bomb and technical data
concerniIng ts manufacture, This was done as a
presentation gift at the time. the Soviet leader
went tc the Uni.'ted States for talks with Eisenhower
in Septembe.r7 2
Several fascinating questions arise from this revelation,
throwing doubt on its precision but probably not on its general
importance as an indication of a major turning point in Sino-
Soviet relations in 1959, First, the date on which the treaty
was supposedly signed preceded by three days, as we shall see,
the arrival of a Chinese mIlitary group in Moscowc It is not
excluded, of course, That there may have been i.nitiated by
plenipotenti aries on October 1 sme protoc that served as
the basis for subseqent negotiations. Second , since the Chinese
statement does not 'ndacate the preci:e nature of the .1957 agree-
ment except to state that it concerned nationa. defense, it is
not necessarly true, as some have concluded, that "Moscow
promised to furnish Peking one *or several nampes of the Russian
A-bomb and to supply scientifirc information to help with the con-
struction of a 'oib. The eventual Sovlet refusal to provide
a sample bob may have vtolated the spirit but not neces arI-iy
the letter of the October 97 agreement. Third, one wonders
why Khrushchev would make far-reaching concessions to China in
127inGrift.oct, pPDoc ument T in Griffith, op p 340-353, at p. 351,
See Robert G ui lains artic "Ten Years of Secree y,
written for Le Monde, but appearing also in Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists, February 1965, pc 24,
late 1957, after his successful ouster of the antiparty group
and Zhukov, the recent displays of Soviet rocket power, and the
diminution of ferment in the "people's democracies." The answer
may be that Khrushchev still needed China's support, for Gomulka
and other East European leaders came to the November 1957 Moscow
conference intent upon pursuing their polycentric ways. To
their surprise they found that Mao Tse-tung had already aligned
with Khrushchev and that the Chinese leader personally championed
the formula "the socialist camp headed by the Soviet Union. ,14
This gesture may have been as much anti-Yugoslav as it was pro-
Soviet, but Khrushchev benefited greatly and may have paid a
high price, perhaps the defense technology pact.
The accuracy of the Chinese statements about the 1957-1959
pact has not been specifically challenged or confirmed by Moscow,
although the Kremlin has indicated that it did refuse sample
atomic bombs to Pekingo Further, the Soviets have accused China
not only of "making public classiJ.fied documents and information
relating to the defenses of the countries of the socialist com-
munity, and, what is more, of presenting the facts tendentiously,
in a distorted light."15
14 For the November 1957 Moscow meeting, see Griffith, op.
cit., pp. 17, 396-398, 415-417, 445, and, more recently, Suslov
in Pravda, April 3, 1964, and "The Proletarian Revolution and
Khrushchev's Revisionism--Comment on the Open Letter of the CPSU
(VIII)," Jen-min Jih-pao and Hung Ch'i, March 31, 1964, and Peking
Review, Vol. VII, No. 14 (April 3, 1964), pp. 5-23-
15 Soviet statement of August 21, 1963, Document 8 in
Griffith, ok cit, PP- 354-370, at p. 365.
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What we do know is that a large delegation of Chinese
scientists headed by the president of the Chinese Academy of
Sciences was in the Soviet Union from October 18, 1957 (three
days after the pact is supposed to have been signed) to January
18, 1958 and that during this period agreement was reached for
joint Soviet-Chinese scientific research in 1958-1962 on 122
different items. Later reports indicated that the key fields in
this research would be physics and the peaceful uses of atomic
16
energy.
A hint that military matters were also involved in these
negotiations came on November 6, 1957, when a high-level Chinese
mission left for Moscow without prior publicity. Mao Tse--tung,
as noted above, was also in Moscow in November for discussions
with Khrushchev prior to the Party Conference. However, the
different emphases in speeches by Defense Ministers Peng Teh-
huai and Malinovsky on November 27, 1957--after the "Moscow De-
claration" of the Conference- -suggested that the Kremlin had not
yet committed itself to providing nuclear weapons to China.17
This latter interpretation gained support from a sudden
reversal. in the trend of Chinese military doctrine in 1958,
16 Hsieh, oR cita, pp. 100-101. A delegation of the Supreme
Soviet had been in Peking at the time of the alleged agreement of
October 15, 1957, but was probably too low-ranking to have signed
an obligation of this nature. See Alice L. Hsieh, "The Sino-
Soviet Nuclear Dialogue: 1963," The Journal of Conflict Resolution,
Vol. VIII, No. 2 (June 1964), p. ll.
17 Hsieh, 2 i, 102.
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strongly implying a Soviet refusal to satisfy fully China's
nuclear aspirations. A military training program promulgated by
Peking in January 1958 indicated an expectation that China would
receive modern weapons from Russia. It stressed the importance
of incorporating "Soviet advanced experience" in the "develop-
ment of modern military techniques and. military science" and of
coordinating "various branches of the Army in combat under the
modern conditions of atom bombs, chemical warfare and guided
missiles . . ." But after an interim period in which the new
program was not approved or even heard of again a new strategic
line was proclaimed in mid-1958 that turned the January program
on its head. "Dogmatism" in the blind. reliance on foreign ex-
perience, experts, and textbooks was condemned. Slavish reliance
on the Soviet Union (by name) was said to have a harmful effect
on China's military modernization. Man-not technology--was
termed the decisive factor in modern war. A series of official
statements in early and mid-August 1958 made the point that China
should not and. could not rely on outside military aid, but ought
to carry out its own research in the newest technology, even
while mobilizing the masses. The validity of Mao Tse-tung's
strategic ideas from the 1930's was reaffirmed for the contem-
porary era as the "Great Leap Forward" endeavored to establish a
national militia organized in communes 18
18 Ford, co cit., pp. 161-165; see also Ralph L. Powell,
"Everyone a Soldier: The Communist Chinese Militia." Foreign
Affairs, Vol. 39, No. 1 (October 1960), pp. 100-111, Peking's
- 12-
While this stress on the need for self-reliance suggested
a lack of confidence in Soviet aid, Chinese spokesmen in May I
1958 nevertheless gave the first public indication that their
19
country planned to produce nuclear weapons. Their announce-
ments could have been geared to the commencement of operation in
September 1958 by the nuclear reactor promised to China in 1955,
although the process by which this reactor built up the requisite
plutonium stockpiles would be lengthy, taking at least five
years, and would require a Russian blank check to use irradiated
fuel rods for that purpose.2 0  It is perhaps more likely that
the announcements, if meant as realistic predictions, were based
on some new Soviet aid commitment in late 1957 or early 1958.
It might have taken the form of an outright transfer of nuclear
weapons, stationing of Soviet weapons to China under joint con-
trol, or the initiating (or intensification) of Soviet scientific
and technological assistange- to China's nuclear weapons program,
continued infatuation with the militia is suggested by the publi-
cation in China's leading newspapers on January 4., 1964 of a
new poem by Mao Tse-tung, entitled "Inscription for the Portrait
of a Militia Woman," Peking Review, Vol.o VII, No, 2, (January 10,
1964), P 3
19 Klaus Mehnert, Peking and Moscow (New York: Putnams,
1,963), p. 436; Ciro E. Zoppo, "The Test Ban: A Study in Arms
Control Negotiation" (unpub. Ph.D. diss., Columbia University,
1.963), PP. 379-380.1
20 Arnold Kramish, "The Chinese People's Republic and the
Bomb" (Santa Monica, Cal. : RAND Corporation, P-1950, March 23,
1960), p. 50 For a list of monographs and periodical and. news-
paper articles in the English language on atomic energy research
and technology in Mainland China, see "Nuclear Research and
Technology in Communist China," External Research Paper 39, U.S.
Department of State, July 1963- 7p
The first possibility seems unlikely in view of Moscow's
consistent interest in containing Chinese policies, especially
those that could lead to escalation. There were signs that
Soviet and Chinese views toward "limited. war" began to diverge
at this time, particularly in the Quemoy crisis of 1958, when
Moscow refused to back China in its perilous moves.
The second alternative was hinted at by Khrushchev in his
talk with Averell Harriman on June 23, 1959, but the Soviet Premier
spoke only of rockets being shipped to China, not nuclear war-
heads, and he did not specify that rockets had been put in China's
hands. Subsequently, in September 1961, Khrushchev told C. L.
Sulzburger of The New York Times that no nuclear warheads or
long-range missiles were stationed outside Soviet territory
except "perhaps in East Germanyc" One informed speculation is
that Khrushchev's remark to Harriman was designed to confuse
U-S0 planners and perhaps to offer a means of meeting Peking's
demands on the strategic level. The Chinese charge in 1963
that Moscow refused in 1959 to provide a sample atomic bomb could
corroborate the latter supposition.
In fact both of these possibilities seem to be scouted by
the Chinese charge that "Tn 1958 the leadership of the CPSU put
forward unreasonable demands designed to bring China under Soviet
21 Hsieh,.: o cit, pp, 164-166.
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military control," but that "these unreasonable demands were
rightly and firmly rejected by the Chinese Government. "22
Howlever, the third possibility-Soviet technical aid to
China's i.ndigenous atomic production--was most likely. Such a
commitment could have been ambiguous, qualified, and long-terma
It could have reen tied to the 122-point scientific cooperation
program agreed on in January 1958. Perhaps it was the failure
of Moscow to "deliver" on this program that led. to Chinese com-
plaints and Moscow's eventual flat refusal to go further in
assisting Chinas nuclear program..
According to President Johnson, Soviet assistance to China's
nuclear program did not entirely cease until 1960, when Sovit
22
Chinese statement of September 6, 1963, Document 10 in
Griffith, o , pp 388-420, at p, 399. A causal tie between
the rejection of these "demands" and Moscow's refusal in 1959 to
give China a. sample atom bomb is suggested by this same Chinese
statement's allegation that the one event followed "not l.ong"
after the other. As to the nature of the 1958 "demands " Edward
Crankshaw and Raymond. L- Garthoff have suggested. that Moscow may
have proposed a joint naval command in the Pacific and integrated
air defense arrangements. (Edward, Crankshaw, "Sino-Soviet RIft
Held Very Deep " The Washington Post, February 12, 1961; Raymond
L. Garthoff, "Sino-Soviet Military Relations," Annals of the
American Academ of Political. and Social Science, Vol, 349
[September 196 p7 TZ77 Going further, the Soviet proposals
could conce. ably have included a bid for Russian bases in China
and joint Sinc-Soviet control of nuclear weapons and ad.vanced
delivery systems on Chinese territory or even for close miliary
cooperation across the board. (See Hsieh., "The Sino-Soviet Nu-
clear Dialogue" 1963," loc. cit.) A participant in the Moscow
Conference in 1.960 heard'reports that Peking had earlier refused
"the Soviet government permission to build a joint early warning
radar station that would be used to defend Pacific waters, Chin ese
and. Soviet, for mutual protection." (Elizabeth Gurley Flynn,
"Recollections of the 1960 Conferences," Polit.ical Affairs (New
York VoL XLII, No 1.1 (November 1963), p. 30.)
-15-
technicians withdrew "with the blueprints under their arms. "23
Taking into account the various ways of producing a nuclear device
and the Atomic Energy Commissions's analysis of Peking's atomic
explosion in October 1964, scholars have concluded that the blast
was probably made with enriched uranium from a gaseous diffusion
24
plant probably constructed with Soviet aid.
The evidence pro and con summarized here is hardly com-
plete, but it seems to throw doubt on the extent of the Soviet
commitment in 1957 and the nature of Soviet aid. to China's nu-
clear program from 1957 to 1959 It seems reasonable to conclude
with Alice L. Hsieh-even after the 1964 Chinese explosion--that
the 1957 agreement was probably "general in tone," making some
provision for Soviet aid in the construction of facilities but
leaving unspecified, the nuclear technical data 'to be made avail-
able to China2 Whatever the extent and kind, of aid, however,
23 Speech of October 18, 1964, in The New York Times, Octo-
ber 19, 1964.
24 Morton H, Halperin, China and the Bomb (New York: Praeger,
1965), pp. 75-80; David R. Inglis The Chinese Bombshell,"
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, February 1965, pp. 19-21.
Similarly, in May .65, following the second Chinese nuclear
explosion, the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission expressed the judge-
ment that the first two Chinese atomic devices had utilized ura-
nium derived from a gaseous diffusion plant or other separation
process and not, as some had supposed they would be, from enriched
uranium or a reactor handed over by the Russians before 1960.
See The New York Times, May 21, 1965, p- 7-
25 Hsieh, "The Sino-Soviet Nuclear Dialogue: 1963," loco cit-,
pp, 111-112. On the other hand Robert Guillain, writing for Le
Monde, probably gives a too narrow estimate of Soviet aid when
saying that the 1957 "agreement was probably implemented, at the
-16-
Soviet spokesmen have indicated privately their regrets that it
took place at all.
It may be that contradictory developments in 1956 and 1957
served to make Moscow relatively amenable to Chinese influence
and then to become more resistant by 1958. The Kremlin still
needed Peking's assistance in bringing the Gomukas, Kadars,
and Togliattis into line at the 1957 Moscow Conference. For
whatever reason, Mao proved himself more orthodox in November
1957 than the Moscow patriarchy in urging a vanguard role for
the Soviet party in the world Communist movement. One factor in
Mao's attitude may have been a Soviet commitment in October 1.957
to aid China's nuc.lear program. For his part, however, Khrushchev
had the Moscow Declaration's tribute to Soviet hegemony in his
pocket as well as an improved domestic stance (Zhukov gone to
join the antiparty group in oblivion) and international power
position (the beginnings of the "missile gap" myth) - From this
base of general strength Khrushchev did not need to look kindly
on the independent course manifested in China's more forward
strategy toward imperialism and the Formosa regime and, domesti-
cally, in the economic and ideological innovations of the "Great
Leap Forward." program. All these considerations would lead the
Kremlin to caution in implementing whatever nuclear aid commit-
ment it had made in 1957 either because Moscow still hoped to
very most, only by some scientific documentation and the residence
of Chinese scientists in Russian atomic establishments." (Guillain
loc0 cit. , p. 24.)
-17-
tame the left deviation in Peking or because it feared an inex-
orable break with the colossus to the east. As noted earlier,
Suslov had pointed to 1958 as the beginning year of the Sino-
Soviet rift.26
III. IDEOLOGICAL WARFARE, 1959-1962
The date of June 20, 1959 assigned by China to Moscow's
refusal to provide a sample bomb is consonant with the Soviet
stress at that time on nuclear-free zones to which Peking was
responding cooly and with the hint to Harriman that Khrushchev
may have sought to compensate Peking by placing Soviet rockets
on Chinese soil, but without nuclear tips. The timing of the
refusal is also consonant with the Soviet broadcast to North
America on June 12 assailing the "Washington claim" that the
test ban under negotiation could not be trusted because China
would not be a signatory. The broadcast accused Washington of
persisting in this refusal "in order to have an excuse for get-
ting out of all kinds of international agreements. 27 The Chin-
ese claim that Khrushchev "broke" the 1957 pact in June 1959 as
a gift to Eisenhower is not so plausible. While the Kremlin was
pushing for a summit meeting with the West at this time, the
26 See note 4.
27 Radio Moscow, International Service, June 14, 1959,
Khrushchev trip to the United States was not yet arranged. Fur-
ther, it may be doubted that Moscow in 1959 would reveal so much
about the Sino-Soviet rift and military relations to Washington
as the .1963 Chinese accusation implies. But there is no doubt
that Sino-Soviet relations were strained throughout 1959. The
positions taken by the Twenty-first Soviet Party Congress in
February appeared to rebuff Peking on two counts: first, with
their stress on peaceful coexistence, and second, by claims that
the Soviet Union was entering a period of the rapid building of
the foundations of communism. More important, Soviet dissatis -I
faction with the leftward turn in Peking coincided with similar
feelings by Defense Minister P'eng Teh-huai, and strong eridence
suggests that Khrushchev backed P'eng in a challenge to Mao s
authority (which was put down at the Lushan plenum in July and
August 1959). 28 To make matters worse, the Soviet governmentI
declared its neutrality in the Chinese-Indian border clashes in
September, and Khrushchev journeyed from Camp David and to Peking
to campaign for a peaceful solution of the Formosan Straits prob-
lem.2 9
28 David A. Charles, "The Dismissal. of Marshal P'eng Teh-
huai," The China Quarterly, No. 8 (October-December 1961),
pp. 63-76.
29 See the Chinese statement of August 21, 1963, Document 9,
in Griffith, oZ. cit., P. 382. The decisive importance of 1959
as a turning point in Sino-Soviet relations is suggested also by
the pattern of trade: "From 1955 to 1956 the Chinese began to
repay their debts by substantially increasing their deliveries,
whereas the Soviets reduced their exports. . . . Soviet exports
Increasing Soviet concern over ChinaIs military pretensions
was evident in the negotiations concerning a test ban and acces-
sion to it by fourth parties.c During the 1957 negotiations in
London Soviet representative Zorin once asserted that he could
find no real reason why China should not accede to a treaty ban-
ning nuclear tests,30 But soon after the Geneva Conference on
the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests began in 1958 Moscow
seems to have revised this optimistic forecast. On December 4,
1958 Soviet delegate Tsarapkin objected to the Western position
that the proposed test ban treaty being drafted should contain
an article on accession of other parties, warning: "You wish to
liberate a genie from a bottle whom you will not be able to put,
back in the bottle and. keep under control. " Tsarapkin in the
preceding weeks had argued that the ban and control system should
be limited to the three powers and that the moral and political
force arising from. their agreement would. be adequate to prevent
tests by other states. Shortly afterwards, on January 12, 1959,
to China thus declined markedly from 1956 through 1958, while
Soviet-Indian trade jumped, more than 500 per cent in 1956 and
nearly doubled agair by 1958. Similarly, the temporary upsurge
of Soviet exports to China during 1959 and 1960 again coeineided
with a simultaneous slump in exports to India." Finally, after
reaching its highest total. volume in 1959, Sino-Soviet trade
rapidly dwindled. so that the turnover was less in 1962 than it
had been in 1951. A more than 50 per cent decline in Soviet
exports to China during 1961 was paralleled by a near doubling
of exports to India. (Griffith, o. _cit., pp. 233, 234.)
30 United Nations, Subcommittee of the Disarmament Commis-
sion, Verbatim Record, plenary session of July 12, 1957, p. 15.
he modified, this position to the extent that a provision on
accession was possible so long as the operation of the treaty
with respect to the three original parties was not linked with
the accession of other states.31
Following Moscowvs declaration of its neutrality in the
Sino-Tndian border conflict of September 1959, and Khrushchev's
fraternization with Eisenhower, the Chinese began increasingly
to criticize Moscow's pursuit of East-West detente and disarma-
ment. In February 1960 the magazine China Youth called disarma-
ment an "impractical fantasy" since the imperialists would never
disarm themselves. The Chinese observer at a Warsaw Pact con-
ference in February insisted that since the United States wanted
an arms race, "the struggle for general disarmament is a long-
term complicated struggle between us and imperialism 0  In
April 1960 came the Chinese broadside entitled "Long Live
Leninismi" Imperialism had. not changed since Lenin's day, it
was asserted, and to attempt to negotiate disarmament or a relaxa
tion of tensions was to mislead the people33
31 A. L. Hsieh, "The Chinese Genie: Peking's Role in the
Nuclear Test Ban Negotiations" (Santa Monica, Cal, : RAND Corpora-
tion, P-2022 , June 20, 1960), pp. 1-2.
NCNA English, Moscow, February 4, 1960 (SCMP 2194, Febru-
ary ll, 1960, pp. 42-46, at p. 44), cited in Zoppo, o. cit ,
p. 382.
For text, see G. F. Hudson, Richard Lowenthal, and Roderick
MacFarquhar, The Sino-Soviet Dispute (New York: Praeger, 1961),
pp. 82-112. The Kremlin replied almost immediately, when Otto
Kuusinen told a Lenin anniversary meeting at the Moscow sports
palace that those who opposed the CPSU's "creative development"
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The U-2 incident seemed somewhat to vindicate the Chinese
image of the West. But Moscow continued. in the following months
to uphold, its view that some members of Western "ruling circles"
took a sober and reasonable approach to East-West relations
Khrushchev now recalled Soviet specialists from China, sharply
reduced Soviet trade with China, and reportedly tried to over-
throw the Albanian leadership,
Following the attempted settlement at the 8 1-party meeting
in Moscow in November 1960 there was an apparent lull in Sino-
Soviet relations in 1961. This was shattered, however, at the
Twenty- second CPSU Congress in October when Khrushchev denounced
Albania, later breaking off diplomatic relations with Tirana.
From March to September 1962 another outward lull seemed to pre-
vail--a period of curious ambivalence in Soviet policy.
IV. NON-PROLIFERATION AND THE TEST BAN, 1962-1963
In late August 1962, according to Chinese sources, Moscow
informed Peking of a decision to inhibit the spread of nuclear
weapons:
On August 25, 1962, two days before the United
States and Britain put forward their draft treaty
of Leninism with respect to matters of war and peace were adopt-
ing a "dogmatic" position. He rejected the argument that
minimized the significance of nuclear weapons on the ground that
man, not technique, determined. history. (Ibid., ppo 116-122.)
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on the partial halting of nuclear tests, the Soviet
Government notified China that T.S Secretary of
State Rusk had proposed an agreement stipulating
that, firstly, the nuclear powers should undertake
to refrain from transferring nuclear weapons and
technical information concerning their manufacture
to non-nuclear coutries, and that, secondly, the
countries not in possession of nuclear weapons should
und.ertake to refrain from manufacturing them, from
seeking them from the nuclear powers or from accept-
ing technical information concerning their manufacture.
The Soviet Government gave an affirmative reply to
this proposal of Rusk'sI
The Chinese Government sent three memoranda to
the Soviet Government, on September 3, 1962, October
20, 1962, and, June 6, 1963, stating that it was a
matter for the Soviet Government whether it committed
itself to the United States to refrain from trans-
ferring nuclear weapons and technical information
concerning their manufacture to China; but that the
Chinese Government hoped, the Soviet Government would.
not infringe on China s sovere'gn rights and act
for China in assuaming an obligation to refrain from,
manufacl-uring nuclear weapons. We so.lemnly sftated
that we wculd not tolerate the conclusion, in dis-
regard of China's opposition, of any sort of treaty
between the Soviet Government and the United States
which aimed at depriving the Chinese people of their
right to take steps to resist the nuclear threats of
Uoo imperialism, and that we would. isue statements
to make our position known 34
Peoples Daiy charged on September 12., 1962 that the United
States was obstructing the progress of the ENDC by demanding
on-site inspections. But the article went on to indicate a deeper
concern. The U .S,-T0 U.K, statement on tes ting, said People Ks
Daily, declared that the
treaty would make it easier to prevent the spread
of nuclear weapons to countries not now possessing
34 Chinese statement of August 15, 1963, Document 7 in
Griffith, o cit, p 351-
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them. . . . The reason U.S. ruling circles are so
interested in preventing what they call nuclear
proliferation is not secret, . . Washington is
anxious to tie China's hands in developing nuclear
weapons.
People's Daily went on to say that
only a complete ban on nuclear weapons and the
unconditional destruction of all existing nuclear
weapons can prevent a nuclear war. . . . The discon-
tinuance of nuclear tests , . . should under no
circumstances become a means by which the United
States may achieve and maintain nuclear superiority. 5
Did Moscow--as Peking alleges--inform the Chinese leadership
on August 25, 1962 that it would sign a nonproliferation agree-
ment with the United States? Shortly before the Cuban missile
crisis erupted Moscow shifted its position on two central arms
control issues. First, on August 29 and September 3, 1962, after
rejecting two alternative test ban proposals put forward by the
United States on August 27, the Soviet delegate to the Eighteen
Nation Disarmament Conference (ENDC) announced his government's
willingness to sign a three-environment test ban with a moratorium
on underground testing "while continuing negotiations on the
final prohibitions of such exp.losions.* A similar proposal had
been made by Moscow on November 28, 1961, but with the provision
that inspection over the underground test moratorium could
take place only in the context of a comprehensive disarmament
NCNA English, Peking, September 12, 1962 . (SCMP 2820,
September 18, 1962, pp 30-31) This policy statement crowned
a series of declarations on disarmament in which nuclear test
cessation was generally made dependent on the banning of nuclear
weapons. See Zoppo, o. cit, p. 385-
agreement, Moscow's position of August 29-September 3, 1962
seemed no longer to be contingent upon GDC measures being enacted,
but Soviet representative Kuznetsov clouded the issue on Septem
ber 5, 1962 by reiterating Moscow's support for its stand of
November 28, 1961. In any event, the Western delegates rejected.
the new Soviet overture on principle because-after Soviet test
resumption in 1961-the West would no longer consent to an
unpoliced, moratorium. But the shift in Moscow's position on
August 29, 1962 was described by Pravda on the following day as
"opening the way to agreement" and was soon thereafter similarly
featured by the Soviet publication New Times (Russian edition,
September 8, 1962). On October 1, 1962 in Ashkhabad, Khrushchev
reiterated Soviet willingness to sign an agreement on a partial3
test ban on the terms articulated by Mr. Kuznetsov' 37
The second shift in Moscow's position prior to Cuba took
place during the general. debate of the Seventeenth General
Assembly. Foreign Minister Gromyko announced, on September 21',
1962: I
Taking account of the stand of the Western Powers
the Soviet Government agrees that in the process of
destroying vehicles for the delivery of nuclear
weapons at the first stage exception be made for a
strictly .imited and agreed number of global inter-
continental missiles, anti-missiles, and antiaircraft
36 ENDC/PVy76, August 29, 1962, pp 1.4-23; ENDC/PVo79,
September 3, 1962, pp. 72 and, 78-800 See also Verbatim Records
of September 5, 1962.
Pravda, October 2, 1962
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missiles of the ground-to-air type which would re-
main at the disposal of the Union of Soyiet Socialist
Republics and the United States alone.3b
Ostensibly this concession was made to meet the Western demands
for retention of a "nuclear umbrella" during the early stages of
the disarmament program§ 9 But the threat to Peking was mani-
fest: only the two superpowers would retain the nuclear umbrella,
(A year later Moscow extended the proposal to cover the third as
well as the second stage of disarmament.)
The aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis to the "Moscow
Treaty" on nuclear testing is a story of almost unrelieved deter-
ioration in Sino-Soviet relations and of steady progress toward
TJ.S-Soviet detente generally and entente on arms control, Presi-
dent Kennedy's June 10, .1963 "Strategy of Peace" address
announced that high-level talks on a nuclear test ban would com-
mence shortly in Moscow. A dominant theme of the speech was
"Common Interests of the United States and the Soviet Union."
38 United Nations Document A/PVl27, September 25, 1962,
pp0 38-40.
39 But during the brief third session of the ENDC in Novem-
ber and December Soviet spokesmen refused to clarify the Gromyko
proposal until, it was accepted "in principle" by the West.
(ENDC/PV.83, November 26, 1962, po 22.) Some elucidation took
place on March 27, 1963 when the Soviet delegate spelled out for
the first time that Moscow would permit inspection of the missile
launch pads0  (ENDC/PV.114, March 27, 1963, PP. 39-40)
For analysis, see the introduction to Toward a Strategy
of Peace, edited by Walter C0 Clemens, Jr. (Chicago: Rand McNally,
196)
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Khrushchev commented favorably on the address, but Peking
42
termed it "Kennedy's Big Conspiracy." On June 14 came the
Chinese "open letter" to the CPSU, in effect scuttling any hope
that the Sino-Soviet talks scheduled to begin soon in Moscow
could lead to any reconciliation. 4 The Soviet reply on July 14
gave a cop de grace to any prospect of rapprochement with Peking
Replying to Peking's criticism of Khrushchev's view "that the
Kennedy government also displayed a certain reasonableness and
a realistic approach in the course of the crisis around Cuba ,"
the Soviet party letter asked rhetorically whether the Chinese
"really think that all bourgeois governments lack all reason in
everything they do. 4 The upshot was the collapse of the Sino-
Soviet party negotiations and the quick movement by mutual com-
promise to the initialing of the limited nuclear test ban on-
July 25, 196343
41 Pravda and Izvestiia printed the Kennedy address in full
on June 13. Khrushchev's comments appeared in Pravda on June 15
and in Izvestiia on June 16, 1963 The First Secretary accepted
"with pleasure the appeal for an improvement" in U.S.-Soviet
relations, but criticized Kennedy's address for not coming to
grips with what Khrushchev depicted as the basic problems of the
cold war--the West's refusal to sign a German peace treaty, U.SI
"occupation" of Taiwan, and other manifestations of US. agres-
sion.
42 See Peking Review, Vol. VI, No. 26 (June 28, 1963), ppI
12-14
43 Document 2 in Griffith, 22. cit, pp. 259-288.
Document 3 in ibid. , pp. 289-325, at Po 3032
The three-power negotiations began in Moscow on July 15.
After the first day Moscow let its demand for a non-aggressiOn
IV. DBANG NACH WESTER
There is no doubt that Moscow's relations with China have
been a factor of paramount importance in Soviet arms control and
disarmament policy in the last decade, providing both restraints
and inducements to Soviet moves toward accommodation with the
West. The weight of the inducements resulting from the Chinese
political and--in the long run--potential military threat seems
to have been much more decisive than the restraints which flowed
from Moscow's interest in keeping its most powerful ally within
the fold.
If one were to plot the movement of the key factors in Sino-
Soviet relations bearing upon arms control matters, five trends
would emerge to support the above conclusion. One would see
steadily increasing, f'irst, Moscow's commitment to the theory
and (to a lesser extent) the implementation of the peaceful. co-
existence doctrine as the basis for foreign policy; second, Chin-
ese criticism of this ideological "revisionism" and cooperation
pact issue drop to the background, although it was clear that the
final. communique woul.d have to make some mention of it. The
negotiations thereafter were friendly and businesslike. The main
problems were the withdrawal clause and the questions of deposi-
tories for the treaty. These were solved with relatively little
difficulty, strong Soviet resistance to the former being over-
come by a circumlocution. On July 25 the treaty was initialed
and on August 5, 1963 it was signed.
Already on June 7, 1963 a Soviet publication noted, that Sec-
retary of State Rusk on May 29 had supported the proposal of a
group of U.S. Senators for a partial ban as being in the interest
of both countries. (New Times, No. 23, 1963, po 32 Russian
edition 4)
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with capitalism; third,, Soviet concern over Chinese military
actions in the Formosan Strait and India, combined with anxiety
over frictions along the Sino-Soviet frontier and Chinese talk
about unequal treaties of the nineteenth century; fourth, Soviet
diplomatic moves to achieve a test ban and to propagate the idea
of nuclear-free zones; fifth, Soviet economic and military moves
to choke off China's ability to develop her own atomic military
capacity.
Whereas there was diversity in the West that could be sub-
jected to Soviet political manipulation, Peking presented to
Soviet policy a monolithic front that generally opposed
Khrushchev's efforts toward peaceful coexistence and arms con-
trol agreements with the West. That opposition ran squarely
athwart Moscow's potent interest in maximizing its position of
leadership in the international Communist movement, initially by
keeping China within the Soviet camp and., as this failed., in
keeping ahead of Peking both in the international Communist move-
ment and in influencing the "grayzones. " A third set of Soviet
interests derived from the military desideratum of preventing
Chinese moves that could involve Russia in a war, which in turn
involved keeping China frQm acquiring nuclear weapons. Clearly,
depending on the priority accorded to one or another of these
basic interests, the effect of China could be either to restrain
or accelerate Moscow's posture of accommodation with the West.
Moscow at first, from 1956 to 1959, endeavored to mollify
Peking's political and military aspirations by adding tough
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phrases to Communist pronouncements on East-West relations and
by offering some assistance in developing nuclear strength, No
doubt many Soviet party and military officials found their own
reasons to oppose detente and arms control reinforced by the
realization that such an orientat ion was alienating Peking,,
Even after 1959 a faint hope of rapprochement with China may
have exerted some drag on Soviet policy if only because it add.ed
to other conservative pressures for restraint in moving toward
coexistence.
As we have seen, however, as early as 1956 the Soviet Union
took steps that could, have been expected to grate on Peking's
sensitivities, These feelings may have teen assuaged in 1957
and 1958 by some Soviet assurances of aid to indigenous nuclear
weapons deveflopment in China, but the Soviet Union appeared to
stall on whatever was prcmised and finaly refused flatly to
deliver a bomb or technical data when requested. The propaga-
tion of a nuclear-free Far East was certainly a transparent
device for putting unwelcome pressure on China to refrain from
developing her own nuclear weapons. Moreover, even while the
defense technology pact still existed, the Soviet Union made
some of its most reasonahle negotiating proposals on a test ban
and disengagement. All of this implies that the pressures from
the East did little to inhibit Moscow's arms control strategy;
indeed, far from restraining the Kremlin s interest in negoti-
ating a test ban, concern over China probably acted to overcome
some reservations Moscow may have had about cutting off nuclear
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testing at an unripe moment or under conditions requirin g
onerous inspection procedures.
The net effect of Soviet advocacy of GCD (general and com-
plete disarmament), though in theory such proposals might appeal
to China because of their implicit opportunities for propaganda
of "exposuCre," served simply to stir up more virulent Chinese
attacks against illusions about a "warless world" before the
overthrw of capita'sm.
Perhaps the main political use that disarmament policies
came to serve in Moscow's relations with Peking was to counter
the Chinese chaLenge to Soviet ideological "revisionism"
Soviet disarmament polley was one source of Chinese displasur 1
But Moscow tried to turn the issue around and use it agaiUnst
Peking by showing that it was incorrect to insist that Lenin's
.1916 dicta on disarmament should guide Communist policy whenI
capitalisn no longer encircled socialism and when the atomic
tomb did not respect the class principlie. 4 6
The threat posed by China to Soviet strategic intereists
seems to have been of special concern to Moscow. In the short
run China might involve Russia in a war with the West, or, at
least, undermaie Soviet efforts for detente, as in 1958-1959.
In the long run there was the possibility of territorial disputesI
46 For a study based on documents released since 1959 of
Lenin's changing views on the possibility and desirability of
disarmament, see Walter Cc Clemens,, Jr., "Lenin on Disarmament,"
Slavic Review, Volo XXIII, No. 3 (September 1964), pp. 504-525K
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and, more important, the prospect of great conventional and nu-
clear Chinese military power. Moscow tried to keep Peking mili-
tarily dependent upon a nuclear shield based in the Soviet Union,
and, from 1957 to 1959, placated Chinese nuclear aspirations by
some kinds of long-term aid. in developing a new defense tech-
nology.
Both in propaganda and, in practice Moscow opposed nuclear
47
proliferation, especially to Germany or China,, In June 1959
Moscow seems to have flatly refused to provide a sample atomic
bomb or technical data required. to prodiuce one. Moscow had
earlier refused to give Mao carte blanche to risk escalation in
the Formosa Stra,-. and in Septemer 1959 declared Soviet neu-
trality in the first Sim-Indian border clashes. Soviet proposals
for a nuclear-free zone in the Far East and Moscow's espousal
of peaceful. coexistence as the highest form of international
class struggle were both aimed in part, a. though with Little
prospect of success, at inhiblting China's military pretensions.
There is reason to speculate, but as yet no firm evidence, that
Khrushchev may have sought i.n 1.962 or 1963 to impose with the
In 1963 Moscow declJared that "an increase in the number
of socialist countries possessing nuclear weapons would irmedi-
ately lead, to a chain reaction in the mperialist camp c
Peking was berated for its opposition to the nuclear test ban,
which allegedly showed the Chinese leaders "desire to acquire
their own atom bomb at any cost." (Soviet statement of Septem-
ber 21, 1963, Document 12 in Griffith, oE cit, pp. 426-467,
at pp. 434, 433-)
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West a nonpro.lifearat ion agreement upon China.
The net resulIt of China's military and political threat
was to push Moscow steadily westward, to increase its interest
in arriving at a test Loan and, other agreements. to impede prolif-
eration, and to defend in ever stronger terms the thesis that
"a world without arms is a world without war." By mid-1959 the
die was cast as Moscow tried to prevent the spread of nuclear
weapons to Chtna and to rebut forcefully its ideological Critique3
Even after the U-2 incident and the Paris Summit debacle n 1960
Moscow have no quarter to Chinese orthodoxy. At Buchare-t i n
June and in Moscow later on in the year Khrushchev assailed
dogmatic insi itene that Imperialism remained unchanged . The
deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations in late 1962 and the
evident abandonmient of Soviet hopes cf mending the breach probaby
helped removie the last inhibitions in Moscow to moves toward3
detente and arms control with the Wes-. The 1963 "Treaty of
Moscow" was then used against Pekig-even in propaganda to the
"third world "- likening the Chinese opponents of the test tan to
"rmadnen" such as Goldwater and Adenauer.
Whether the needs of Soviet state security and Moscow' ro
in. the Communist movement could be effectively upheld against the
Chinese threat by reliance on arms control and collaboration withI
the West was another matter. What arms controls would be effe. I
tie--a test ban, a nonproliferation agreement, CDi
"nuclear umbrella" for the superpowers? The more feasile arms;
controls seemed also the less promising as ways of keeping China
from membership in the nuclear club. Or should. Moscow continue
to fight a two-front struggle, hoping that Soviet military and
economic prowess would deter the not-too-aggressive West and
suffice for many years before the somewhat more aggressive Chin-
ese became a great mi.i.tary power?
These were questions to which Moscow may not have given a
firm answer. But the evidence suggests that the Chinese pressure
goaded the Soviets increasingly toward attempts at arms controls
and disarmament propaganda that would impede if not check the
Chinese military and ideological challenge.
Chinese pressure probably added to Khrushchev's reasons for
seeking tangible proof that a peaceful coexistence policy could.
pay off in mutually advantageous agreements with moderates in
the West. The very necessity of having to defend his policies
from Chinese criti1 cism may have made Khrushchev more determined.
in his commitment to East-West detente, and. what may have been a
tentative probing tactic might, in the process of warding off
Chinese attack, have become more of a broad strategy.
None of this is to imply that Moscow did not wish and pre-
fer to keep China a member of a Soviet-dominated international
48 A Soviet desire to keep China in the fold. may on the
other hand have spurred occasional Soviet attacks on Yugoslav
"revisionism" in the period under review. But Moscow had addi-
tional concerns--excessive liberalism within the Soviet Union
and. Eastern Europe--to motivate attacks on revisionism,
Communist movement. But if a choice had to be made, it appeared
increasingly that Moscow would prefer to alienate China than to
forgo opportunities for policy successes in the West--especiall.y
if such successes helped to keep China from obtaining nuclear
weapons or if they served to undermine the "dogmaatist" line on
the unchanging nature of imperialism. Consciously or not, the
Kremlin's sense of common interest with the governments of the
industrialized and status quo nations of the West was no doubt I
deepened as the Weltanschauung and strategy favored by Peking
parted from that of Moscow
